Abstract. Human memory is not perfect -people constantly memorize new facts and forget old ones. One example is forgetting a password, a common problem raised at IT help desks. We present several protocols that allow a user to automatically recover a password from a server using partial knowledge of the password. These protocols can be easily adapted to the personal entropy setting [7] , where a user can recover a password only if he can answer a large enough subset of personal questions. We introduce client-server password recovery methods, in which the recovery data are stored at the server, and the recovery procedures are integrated into the login procedures. These methods apply to two of the most common types of password based authentication systems. The security of these solutions is significantly better than the security of presently proposed password recovery schemes. Our protocols are based on a variation of threshold encryption [5, 8, 17 ] that may be of independent interest.
Introduction
People constantly memorize new facts, but also forget old ones. One quite common example is forgetting a password. It is one of the most common problem raised at IT help-desks. Therefore, many systems for password recovery (PR) have been built. The common aim of all these systems is to provide reliable solutions for legitimate users to recover lost passwords or to receive a new password (i.e., resetting the old password), without significantly increasing the vulnerability against attackers.
The simplest way to authenticate the user is to use an out-of-band channel, like a phone call, or show up physically at a system administrator. This is costly however, and cumbersome. More user-friendly, but less secure, is the common method used by many websites that store the password of the user in the clear and resend it to the user's email address on request. Sometimes websites require a user to answer some personal question, like "what is your mother's maiden name?". However, this method is insecure because a password sent in cleartext can be easily intercepted and it is relatively easy to answer such a single question.
Another widely used method to cope with forgetting passwords is a password reset system. In this system when a user forgets the password then the server sets a new password and emails the new password to the client (again maybe after answering a personal question). Now the legitimate user can regain system access easily. However, the security of this system depends heavily on the security of the email server, and therefore, this system is uninteresting from our point of view.
There is quite a lot of research on more sophisticated PR methods that do not fully trust the server. One approach is to use secret sharing [2, 18] . This solution divides a password into n shares (that are stored on trusted servers) in such a way that for the reconstruction, it is necessary to collect at least a threshold t of these shares. However, the user still needs to authenticate somehow to the servers, and therefore this system does not fully solve our problem.
In [7] a PR system, based on personal entropy, is proposed. In this system, a user is asked some questions about his personal history during password registration. The system generates a random secret key, and encrypts the real password with it. Subsequently, the answers given by the user are used to "encrypt" the random secret key. The user then stores the questions, the "encryption" of the secret value, and the encryption of the password on his computer. A secret sharing scheme is used to enable password recovery, even if some questions are answered incorrectly. The drawback of this scheme is the lack of a rigorous security analysis. In fact, [3] demonstrates a serious weakness of this scheme: with the parameters recommended for a security level of 2 112 , the system is in fact vulnerable to an attack that requires only 2 64 operations.
The ideas from [7] were improved in [9] . This improved password recovery uses error-correcting codes instead of a secret sharing scheme. A rigorous security analysis is performed in the chosen model. The solution of [9] uses techniques that are very close to secure sketches.
Secure sketches and fuzzy extractors (described e.g., in [6] ), and their robust versions [12, 15] , are cryptographic tools useful for turning noisy information into cryptographic keys and securely authenticating biometric data. They may also be used to solve the password recovery problem. However, contrary to intuition, it seems hard to use these cryptographic primitives to solve password recovery in our most secure model, as show in Section 3.
We believe that [7, 9] are a significant step towards a practical PR solution. However, such so-called local PR systems are vulnerable to attackers that steal the recovery data from the user's machine (which is quite often inadequately secured) and then mount an offline brute force attack to recover the password. To avoid this scenario, we introduce client-server password recovery, in which the recovery data should be stored at the server, and PR should be integrated into the login procedure. In such a setting (under the more reasonable assumption that the recovery data cannot be stolen from the secure server) an attacker can only perform an online brute force attack. Security then can be increased by limiting the number of tries per account, or increasing the response time.
Our contributions are the following. Firstly, we introduce the password recovery problem and the client-server PR security model, together with a short analysis of password authentication systems, in Section 2. All our client-server PR systems apply to a simple (low entropy) password login system. In all these
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login → 2) (q, g, d) = LOOK-UP(DT, login); ← 3) Chooses random b = g c and sends it. Fig. 1 . challenge-response password authentication system PR systems, the client is stateless, and all recovery data is stored at the server. Our solutions reduce the entropy somewhat, but are still more secure than other approaches. Moreover, our ideas can be straightforwardly applied to the personal entropy system, as shown in Subsection 2.2, making the recovery phase more secure. We elaborate on using secure sketches and fuzzy extractors for PR in Section 3. Subsequently, we present a new algorithm (Section 4) for local PR that is based on intraceability Assumption 2 from [14] . In Section 5, we introduce a new variant of threshold encryption [5, 8, 17] , called equivocal threshold encryption, that does not provide validity proofs for the decryption shares. Combining these two, we present protocols for client-server PR integrated into two classes of systems for password based login: the most common, hash based one in which the server keeps hashes of passwords but receives cleartext passwords during the login phase (Section 6), and the most secure solution, based on challenge response, in which the server never sees passwords in clear at all (Section 7). Moreover, in Appendix A we briefly present a simple substring-knowledge PR working in the challenge response setting. Furthermore, all our password recovery systems can be easily modified to work as password reset systems. Due to space constraints we omit these easy transformations. Due to space constraints in this version of the paper, proofs of security and correctness of the presented protocols are short and informal.
Password Recovery Model
In this section we discuss the kinds of password authentication (PA) systems for which we consider password recovery, define exactly what we mean by password recovery, and talk about the kinds of adversaries our protocols need to withstand.
Password Authentication (PA) Systems
Two kinds of participants are involved in PA systems: users (also called clients) and servers. Clients have a username (also called login) and a password p=p 1 , . . . p n , where p i ∈ D and D is the domain of characters of passwords (D is usually small, e.g., |D| ≈ 100). For simplicity, we assume that clients always remember their logins, and that the length of the password n is fixed for all users.
Initially, a client registers himself (in the registration phase) with the server by submitting a username and an authenticator (derived from the password), which the server stores in its database. Subsequently, the client can authenticate (in the log in phase) to the server using his username and a proof of knowledge of the password. The server, using the authenticator from the database, and the proof of knowledge, can efficiently verify that the user knows the corresponding password. We distinguish three different PA schemes with respect to the security requirements. These systems differ in the way that authenticators and proofs of knowledge are defined: an authenticator can be equal to a password, a proof can be equal to a password (this is the case in hash based systems, where the server stores hashes of passwords), or neither of the above (which is the case for challenge-response type systems, an example of which is presented in Figure 1 ).
The password recovery for the first system is trivial (because the server stores passwords in clear), and we omit it in this paper. The PR solutions for the other two PA systems are presented in Sections 6 and 7, respectively.
Client-Server Password Recovery (PR)
A system for client-server PR has the same participants and log in routine as a PA system. Moreover, it provides an additional routine called password recovery (PR), in which the client tries to recover the lost password. The password registration is also modified: besides submitting the login, and the authenticator, it also submits the recovery data. The client's input in the PR phase is login and a perturbed (incorrect) password
, while the server's input is the database with the logins and the registration data. Local password recovery is similar to client-server password recovery, except that the recovery data is stored locally at the client, and the recovery protocol is run locally at the client.
The requirement is that the client recovers the password, if and only if, p ′ is similar to the password p corresponding to his login. To be precise, we define similarity between strings x and y as x ≈ t y (x matches y), if and only if, t ≤ |{i ∈ {1, . . . n} : x i = y i }|. We assume that the parameters n and t are public.
Note, that having partial knowledge of the password is a very similar recovery condition to the personal entropy one [7, 9] . In the personal entropy system the client needs to answer some threshold of questions (i.e., t out of n questions) to recover the password. The answers to the questions can be considered as an additional password, where every single answer can be treated as a letter. It is easy to transform our systems to work with an auxiliary password, and therefore, with personal questions. We skip these straightforward transformations in this paper.
We develop our protocols based on the following assumptions. We assume existence of the secure channels between the server and clients (which can be achieved using TLS connections). We work in the Random Oracle Model (ROM) [1] , which means that we assume that hash functions work like random functions. Moreover, we use keyed hash functions, also called message authentication codes (MACs), of the form h : {0, 1} k × D → F, where F is a field. The first parameter of h is a random string of length k (the security parameter). For simplicity, we often omit this parameter in our descriptions.
We look for efficient protocols, i.e., O(nk), at the server side (because many clients might want to perform password recovery simultaneously), but we do allow a certain time penalty at the client side.
Adversaries and Security Requirements
All our client-server protocols defend against an adversary impersonating a client. Such an adversary is computationally bounded by k (but not by n log |D|) and is malicious [11] , which means he can disobey the protocols routine. This adversary tries to break a server's privacy that can be informally defined as follows. The impersonator, after any number of unsuccessful PR runs, can recover more information about the password, than following from the fact that the PR invocations failed, only with a negligible probability in k. Notice however, that this adversary can always perform an online brute force attack on the PR routine (even using the password's distribution). But this is easily mitigated by adding timeouts or allowing only a fixed number of tries before blocking an account.
We also consider an adversary accessing the server's database in all our clientserver protocols. We model this adversary differently than the one impersonating client, because this adversary can perform offline brute force attack using the PR routine. Therefore, we define the adversary to not know the password distribution and to be computationally bounded with respect to k and the parameters n, t, |D| (in a way that the problem from Assumption 4.1 is hard). The adversary tries to break a client's privacy that can be informally, defined as follows. For every two passwords p ′ and p ′′ , the corresponding two PR data instances are indistinguishable. An adversary accessing local PR (see Section 4) is defined in the same way.
Only the challenge-response protocol (Section 7) is resistant against a fully corrupted server. The adversary corrupting the server is computationally bounded by k and tries to gain information about client's password guesses from the data received in PR runs. We assume that this adversary is malicious in the sense, that he performs any actions to break the guesses privacy. However, there is no point for him to alter the client's output: the client can easily verify correctness of the recovery by logging in. This approach is very similar to private computation from [14] . The guesses privacy can be defined as follows: from a PR run the adversary gains negligible knowledge about the client's guess.
Problems with Using Robust Fuzzy Extractors and
Secure Sketches for Client-Server PR
In this section we show the main problems of using secure sketches or fuzzy extractors solving client-server PR in our strongly secure model. Secure sketches and fuzzy extractors (see [6] ) can be used for turning noisy information into cryptographic keys and securely authenticating biometric data. Now, let's define secure sketches and fuzzy extractors. Let F be a field, n ∈ N, and ∆ a Hamming distance function in F
n . An (F n , m, m ′ , τ )-secure sketch is a pair of procedures, "sketch" (SS) and "recover" (Rec), with the following properties. Firstly, SS on input w ∈ F n returns a bit string s ∈ {0, 1} * . Secondly, the procedure Rec takes an element w ′ ∈ F n and a bit string s ∈ {0, 1} * . The correctness property guarantees that if ∆(w, w ′ ) ≤ τ , then Rec(w ′ , SS(w)) equals w. The security property guarantees that for any distribution W over F n with min-entropy m, the value of W can be recovered by the adversary who observes s, with probability no greater than 2
−m
′ . An (F n , m, l, τ, ǫ)-fuzzy extractor is a pair of procedures, "generate" (Gen) and "reproduce" (Rep), with the following properties. Firstly, the procedure Gen on input w ∈ F n outputs an extracted string R ∈ {0, 1} l and a helper string P ∈ {0, 1} * . Secondly, Rep takes an element w ′ ∈ F n and a string P ∈ {0, 1} * as inputs. The correctness property guarantees that if ∆(w, w ′ ) ≤ τ and P were generated by (R, P )=Gen(w) then Rep(w ′ , P )=R. The security property guarantees that for any distribution W over F n with min-entropy m, the string R is nearly uniform even for those who observe P . A robust version of fuzzy extractor additionally detects whether the value P got modified by an adversary (which is essential in the biometric authentication).
Secure sketches can be used to solve local PR (Section 4) and client-server PR from Section 6. Roughly speaking, the first case is close to the approach from [9] . Let's consider the second case. The client produces s=SS(p) of his password p and sends it to the server, who stores s. When the client invokes the PR routine by sending p ′ then the server runs p ′′ =Rec(p ′ , s) and if p ′ ≈ t p ′′ then the server sends back p ′′ . This solution is sound and secure, i.e, the server can guess p with probability no greater than 2 −m ′ . However, we do not see a way to transform this solution to the challenge response model, because in this model the server is not allowed to see the password's guesses. We leave finding the transformation of this solution to the challenge response model as a future work.
It would appear that Robust Fuzzy Extractors (RFE) can be used to overcome this problem in, for example, the following way. First the client produces (R, P )=Gen(p) and E R (p) (where E is a symmetric encryption scheme, e.g., AES), and he sends P and E R (p) to the server, who stores them. When the client invokes the PR routine, then the server sends the relevant P, E R (p) to the client. Now, the client can recover R ′ =Rep(p ′ , P ), and try to decrypt: Dec R ′ (E R (p)). This solution is sound and seems secure. However, in our security model this protocol gives too much information to the adversary impersonating the client, because it allows an offline dictionary attack. We remind, that the adversary is computationally bounded by k but not n log |D|. Therefore, the adversary can simply guess l bits (notice, that practically always l < m ≤ n log |D|), and break the protocol. Other solutions based on RFE seem to suffer to the same problem.
Local Password Recovery
As explained in the introduction, a client of local password recovery, similarly to [7, 9] , keeps the recovery data on his machine (there is no server). The client generates the recovery data and later on, tries to recover the lost password from the password guess and the recovery data. In Figure 2 we present a solution for local PR. Its security is based on the following intraceability assumption derived from [14] , which is related to the polynomial list reconstruction problem.
Password Registration: The input is p = p1, . . . pn, where pi ∈ D, and |D| = m. The client:
1. Generates v ∈R {0, 1} k , and n values {h1(p1), . . . hn(pn)}. Every hi is a MAC with implicit first parameter v as described in Section 2.2. 2. Generates n random values s1, . . . sn ∈ F in such a way that points {(h1(p1), s1), . . . (hn(pn), sn)} define a polynomial P of degree t−1, and P (0)=p. 3. Returns: P R=(v, {s1 − g1(p1), . . . sn − gn(pn))}; each g i is a similar MAC to hi. Password Recovery: The input is:
The client tries to reconstruct P from any subset of t elements of S (that is`n tć hecks). He checks whether for any potentially recovered polynomial P ′ the following holds (let
′ then the client outputs ∅.
Fig. 2. Local Password Recovery
The intraceability assumption. Let C t,α n,m denote the probability of distribution of sets generated in the following way:
1. Pick a random polynomial P over F (denote |F| = f ), of degree at most t, such that P (0) = α. 2. Generate nm random values x 1 , . . . x nm ∈ F subject to the constraint that all x i are distinct and different from 0. 3. Choose a random subset S of n different indexes in {1, . . . nm}, and set y i = P (x i ) for all i ∈ S. For every i ∈ S set y i to be a random value in F. 4. Partition the nm (x i , y i ) pairs in n random subsets subject to the following constraints. Firstly, the subsets are disjoint. Secondly, each subset contains exactly one pair whose index is in S (hence y i = P (x i )) and exactly m − 1 pairs whose indexes are not in S. We denote these subsets as S i = {(x (i,j) , y (i,j) )}. Output the resulting subsets.
The intractability assumption states that for any α, α ′ the two probability ensembles C t,α n,m , C t,α ′ n,m are computationally indistinguishable depending on the parameters f , t, m, and n. In our applications the assumption's parameters are set as follows: n and t like in PR, m = |D| and F = Z q , where q is large prime. One may argue that n, t and |D| are relatively small parameters (e.g., n is the length of passwords) and that they might not deliver good security to the system. However, notice that in the personal entropy setting (i.e., the question-answer setting) the parameters can be significantly enlarged. Moreover, we are not aware of any algorithm solving the assumption problem (i.e., finding α) in our setting faster than by guessing t proper points.
We are conscious that for similar problems there exist fast solutions. For example, if in the above problem all x (i,j) = i then the problem can be solved fast (see [3, 4] ). However, these fast algorithms do not solve the problem from Assumption 4.1, as stated in [14] .
The local PR solution. Now we describe the protocol. In the first step the client prepares PR data: v and {s 1 − g 1 (p 1 ), . . . s n − g n (p n )}, such that { (h 1 (p 1 ), s 1 ) , . . . , (h n (p n ), s n )} define a polynomial P of degree t − 1, for which P (0) = p. Here, h i , g i are hash functions (see Figure 2) . Afterwards, the client forgets the password, and tries to recover it from S = {(h 1 (p 1 ),
′ then he obtains in S at least t proper points belonging to P , and can derive the password P (0). Otherwise, informally speaking, the client needs to solve the problem from Assumption 4.1. A succeeds with some probability 
Proof (sketch).
Assume to the contrary that there exists an adversary A, that attacks our local PR with non-negligible advantage. Using A, we construct an adversary A * that breaks Assumption 4.1. Firstly, A sends p 0 , p 1 to A * . A * forwards them to an intraceability oracle (corresponding to Assumption 4.1). This oracle chooses b ∈ R {0, 1}, and answers with n subsets S i = {(x (i,j) , y (i,j) )} sampled from C t,p b n,|D| . Now A * sends to A: v ∈ R {0, 1} k , and n random points in F: {r 1 , . . . r n }. A * defines random oracles (representing h i and g i ) in the following way: for all j ∈ D and i ∈ {1, . . . n}: RO hi (j)=x (i,j) and RO gi (j)=y (i,j) − r i . A * outputs the result of A. Notice, the importance of the implicit random parameter v, which lets random oracles, for two different PR runs, have different outputs (even for the same password).
Because of working in ROM, the distribution of A's input, created in such a way by A * for p b , is identical to the distribution of the client's input created in password registration (from Figure 2) for p b . Therefore, A * 's advantage is equal to A's advantage, and Assumption 4.1 is broken.
⊓ ⊔
Equivocable Threshold Cryptosystem
In this section we define an equivocable threshold encryption (TE) scheme, and we present a slightly modified threshold ElGamal scheme (based on [17] , and the "normal" ElGamal scheme [10] ) that is equivocable. Subsequently, in Sections 6 and 7 we use this scheme to solve the PR problem.
In [8] a standard TE scheme consists of the following components. A key generation algorithm KG takes as input a security parameter k, the number of decryption servers n, the threshold parameter t and randomness; it outputs a public key pk, a list α 1 , . . . α n of private keys, and a list vk 1 , . . . vk n of verification keys. An encryption algorithm Enc takes as input the public key pk, randomness and a plaintext m; it outputs a ciphertext c. A share decryption algorithm SD takes as input the public key pk, an index i ∈ {1, . . . n}, the private key α i and a ciphertext c; it outputs a decryption share c i (called also partial decryption) and a proof of its validity pr i . Finally, a combining algorithm CM takes as input the public key pk, a ciphertext c, a list c 1 , . . . c n of decryption shares, a list vk 1 , . . . vk n of verification keys, and a list pr 1 , . . . pr n of validity proofs. It performs decryption using any subset of {c 1 , . . . c n } of size t, for which the corresponding proofs are verified. If there is no such set then CM fails.
An equivocable TE scheme consists of the same components as above, but: KG does not produce verification keys, SD does not produce validity proofs, and validity proofs are not part of CM 's input. Therefore, CM simply checks if a decryption is possible for any subset c i1 , . . . c it (that is n t checks). A secure equivocable TE scheme should fulfill the standard TE security definition called threshold CPA [8] . Notice, that omitting validity proofs does not help a malicious combiner to decrypt, because he possesses less data than for standard TE. A secure equivocable TE scheme moreover has the following properties. After any number of CM invocations, a malicious combiner (which does not know any secret shares) gains no information about: (1) the plaintexts in unsuccessful runs (semantic security) and (2) the shares used in unsuccessful runs for producing partial decryptions. We formalize this intuition in Definition 5.1. 
ElGamal Equivocable TE Scheme
In this section we introduce our version of the ElGamal scheme and prove that this version is securely equivocable.
Let G =<g> denote a finite cyclic (multiplicative) group of prime order q for which the Decision Diffie-Hellman (DDH) problem is assumed to be infeasible: given g α , g β , g γ , where either g γ ∈ R G (∈ R means that a value is chosen uniformly at random from a set) or αβ = γ mod q, it is infeasible to decide whether αβ = γ mod q. This implies that the computation Diffie-Hellman problem, which is to compute g αβ given g α , g β ∈ R G, is infeasible as well. In turn, this implies that the Discrete Log problem, which is to compute log g h = α given g α ∈ R G, is infeasible. We use the group G defined as the subgroup of quadratic residues modulo a prime p, where q = (p − 1)/2 is also a large prime. This group is believed to have the above properties.
In the ElGamal scheme the public key consists of q, a generator g of G, and h = g α , while the private key is α ∈ {0, . . . q − 1}. For this public key, a message m ∈ G is encrypted as a pair (a, b) = (g r , mh r ), with r ∈ R Z q . Encryption is multiplicatively homomorphic: given encryptions (a,
. Given the private key α = log g h, decryption of (a, b) = (g r , mh r ) is performed by calculating b/a α = m. ElGamal semantic security can be defined using the following game. An oracle first sends pk = (q, g, h) to an adversary. Then the adversary sends plaintexts m 0 , m 1 ∈ G to the oracle, which answers, for b ∈ R {0, 1}, with (g r , m b h r ). Finally, the adversary guesses b. The scheme is semantically secure if the adversary's advantage is negligible. The ElGamal scheme achieves semantic security under the DDH assumption.
In this paper we use a (t, n)-threshold ElGamal cryptosystem based on [17] , in which encryptions are computed using a public key pk = (q, g, h), while decryptions are done using a joint protocol between n parties. The ith party holds a share α i ∈ Z q of the secret key α = log g h, where the corresponding h i = g αi can be made public. As long as at least t parties take part, decryption succeeds, whereas less than t parties are not able to decrypt.
We set the shares as follows: the dealer makes the polynomial f (x) = t−1 i=0 a i x i mod q, by picking a i ∈ R Z q (for 0 < i < t) and a 0 = f (0) = α. In the original scheme, the ith share is α i = f (i), while in our scheme α i = f (x i ), and each x i ∈ R Z q is made public. The schemes security is based on linear secret sharing [18] : t points of a polynomial of degree t − 1 are sufficient to recover the polynomial and less points give no knowledge about f (0). The reconstruction of plaintext can be performed in the following way. For some c = (g r , mh r ), it is required to have t proper partial decryptions g rαi and x i , which can be combined to compute (for any x 0 ):
Hence, because g rf (0) can be computed, c can be decrypted as follows: mh r /g rα = m. Equation 1 describes a polynomial interpolation in the exponent.
We now show that our TE scheme is equivocable with respect to Definition 5.1 under the DDH assumption. For simplicity, we assume that the combiner receives only the data from unsuccessful invocations. However, the successful ones can be handled in a similar way to the security proof of [17] . We prove some lemmas, and then based on them we show that our scheme is equivocable. Proof (sketch) . Assume that A asks the oracle for partial decryptions at most d times (where d is polynomial in k). For simplicity, we assume here that n = t = 2 and d = 2. The proof for greater n, t, and d can be made similarly.
Assume to the contrary that there exists an A, that wins the game with a nonnegligible advantage a. Using A we construct an adversary A * that breaks the ElGamal semantic security. Firstly, A * receives a public key pk = (q, g, g α ) from a "semantic security" oracle, and forwards it to A. A * also generates x 1 , x 2 ∈ R Z q and sends them to A. Then A chooses plaintexts p 0 , p 1 , and sends them to A * . Subsequently, A * forwards them to the oracle, which answers with g r1 , p b g r1α . Now, A * chooses j ∈ R {0, 1} and α j ∈ R Z q . A * computes, using Equation 1, such g αj⊕1 that points:
, and a random permutation π : {1, 2} → {1, 2}. Subsequently, A asks for partial decryptions. When A asks eth time (1st or 2nd time) and π(e) = 1 ∧ i 1 = j then A * answers: g r1 , p b * g r1α , g r1αj . If π(e) = 1 and i 1 = j then A * halts and outputs a random bit. Eventually, if π(e) = 1 then A * sends to A (for r ∈ R Z q ): g r , p b ′ * g rα , g rα2 . Finally, A * returns A's output. Notice that in the case π(e) = 1, the probability that i 1 = j (and the attack stops with a random output) is The proof for greater n and t is easy: A * can simply produce more data α i . In the case of d > 2, the proof is modified as follows. 
Finally, A's result is returned by A * . This construction ensures that A's input is either well constructed or, because of the permutation π, is produced independently of b. The probability of not returning a random bit (when π(e) = 1) is 1/ n t−1 , and is non-negligible in k. Details of this constructions are quite straightforward, and we omit them here. Proof. Successful combining invocations can be handled like in the security proof from [17] . This theorem, for unsuccessful invocations, follows directly from Lemma 5.2 for the first game, and from Lemma 5.3 for the second game.
⊓ ⊔ 6 Password Recovery for the Hash based PA System
In this section we present solutions that work for the most widely used PA system. We present first a simple and secure PR scheme, that has a functional drawback: the server's time complexity is too high for many scenarios. Secondly, we show the solution that eliminates this drawback.
Simple PR System for the Hash based PA System
In the simple PR system the server performs all important security actions. During the registration the client sends to the server the login, and the password p. The server generates the local PR data, like in Section 4. Later, if the client wants to recover p, he sends a perturbed password p ′ to the server, who runs the local PR routine (Section 4). If the recovery was successful then p is sent to the client and the request is rejected otherwise. The correctness and the security of this protocol follows directly from the corresponding local PR properties.
Notice, that the client's privacy is not protected during protocols run (the server even knows the result of PR). Furthermore, there are two significant drawbacks: n t checks on the server side, and we do not foresee any way to transform this protocol to work in the securer, challenge-response model. These problems are solved in Section 6.2.
Improved PR System for the Hash based PA System
We improve the simple PR scheme by combining the equivocable TE scheme (Section 5) with local PR. In this solution, the client checks whether the password recovery is possible. Therefore, the server's time complexity is efficient. The improved PR system is presented in Figure 3 .
During registration the client first produces a public key (q, g, g α ) of the equivocable TE scheme, with the corresponding secret key α and computes an encryption c of the password p. Subsequently, he generates the PR data: secret values v 1 , v 2 (they have the same meaning as v in local PR) and points {(h i (p i ), α i − g i (p i ))|i ∈ {1, . . . n}}. All the points {(h i (p i ), α i )} together with (0, α) define the polynomial of degree t−1. This construction is very similar to the local PR registration. The client also produces the login and the hash of the password for the PA system. Then all these data are stored on the server. Intuitively, the server cannot recover more than in local PR, because he stores the local PR data and an encryption of the password under the secret of the local PR data.
In this paper we have presented secure and efficient solutions for password recovery, where the recovery data is stored securely at the server side. Our solutions apply to all common types of password authentication systems, without significantly lowering their security. We have introduced a variant of threshold encryption, called equivocable, that serves as a building block to our solutions, and that may be of independent interest as well.
Further research could be aimed at alternative definitions of password similarity, that also include reordering of password letters (which is a common mistake). Other issues that can be improved are the n t time complexity at the client side, and the server's time complexity in the challenge-response protocol (Section 7).
